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행동경제학연구

[M1314.000300] Studies in Behavioral Economics · SNUgenie ↗

이 교과목은 심리학과 경제학에 중첩된 이슈들의 경제학적 분석들을 다룹니다. 이 교과목의 주요 목적은 행동경제학의 주요 가설들과 경험적 증거들에 대한 학생들의 이해를 도모하는 것이며, 주요 주제들은 이론과 경험적 증거들을 결부해서 소개될 것입니다.

  • 교과과정: 대학원
  • 성적부여: A~F
  • 학점: [주당] 3-3-0
  • 수업진행: 이론
  • 주관대학(원): 사회과학대학
  • 주관학과(부): 경제학부
  • 교과구분: 전선

강의계획서 (2025-1학기 · 최승주)

강의계획서 원문 ↗

  • 평가: 절대평가, 과제 40% / 기말 40% / 기타 20% (합계 100%)
  • 출석: SNU 기본 정책 (1/3 초과 결석 시 F)

수업목표

인간의 합리성과 표준적인 선호를 가정하여 인간의 의사결정과 행태변화를 이해하는 전통경제학과 달리, 행태경제학(혹은 행동경제학)은 심리학 등에 의해 새롭게 규명되어온 인간에 대한 이해를 바탕으로 인간 의사결정 모형을 확장하고 행태변화를 유도하는 새로운 정책 도구 개발로 영역을 넓혀 오고 있다. 이 강좌는 행태경제학의 주요한 성과를 이론과 실증 증거를 중심으로 살펴보고, 인간행태변화에 대한 통찰에 기반한 정책 설계와 이의 평가를 소개하고자 한다.

강의계획

  • 수업방식: 이론위주, 토론위주, 프로젝트

Topic 1: Economic Rationality Key reading list o Abaluck, J. and J. Gruber (2011), “Choice Inconsistencies among the Elderly: Evidence from Plan Choice in the Medicare Part D Program,” American Economic Review, 101(4), 1180-1210. o Agarwal, S. and B. Mazumder (2013), “Cognitive Abilities and Household Financial Decision Making,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5(1), 193-207. o Bertrand, M. and A. Morse. 2011. “Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases, and Payday Borrowing.” Journal of Finance, 66(6), 1865-1893. o Choi, S., S. Kariv, W. Müller and D. Silverman (2014), “Who Is (More) Rational?” American Economic Review, 104(6), 1518-1550. o Kim, H. B., S. Choi, B. Kim, and C. Pop-Eleches (2018), “The Role of Education Interventions in Improving Economic Rationality,” Science, 362(6410), 83-86. Topics 2. Probability Weighting Key reading list o Bruhin, A. H. Fehr-Duda, T. Epper (2010), “Risk and Rationality: Uncovering Heterogeneity in Probability Distortion.” Econometrica, 78, 1375-1412. o Choi, S., J. Kim, E. Lee, and J. Lee (2022), “Probability Weighting and Cognitive Ability” Management Science, 68(7), 5201-5215. o Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1979), “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” Econometrica, 47, 263-291. o Quiggin, John (1982), “A Theory of Anticipated Utility,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, 323-343. o Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1992), “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297-323. o Wakker, P. P. (2004), “On the Composition of Risk Preference and Belief,” Psychological Review, 111(1):236. Background reading o Wakker, P. P. (2010). Prospect Theory: For Risk and Ambiguity. Cambridge University Press. o Fehr-Duda, H. and T. Epper (2012), “Probability and Risk: Foundations and Economic Implications of Probability-Dependent Risk Preferences,” Annual Review of Economics, 4, 567-593. Topics 3. Reference-dependent Preferences  Reference dependence  Loss aversion Key reading list o Abeler, J., A. Falk, L. Goette, and D. Huffman (2011), “Reference Points and Effort Provision,” American Economic Review, 101(2), 470-492. o Andersen, S., C. Badarinza, L. Liu, J. Marx, and T. Ramadorai (2020), “Reference Dependence in the Housing Market.” o Camerer, C., L. Babcock, G. Loewenstein, and R. Thaler (1997), “Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 407-441. o Card, D. and G. B. Dahl (2011), “Family Violence and Football: the Effect of Unexpected Emotional Cues on Violent Behavior,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126, 103-143. o Crawford, V. P. and J. Meng (2011), “New York City Cabdrivers’ Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent Preferences with Rational-Expectations Targets for Hours and Income,” American Economic Review, 101(5), 1912-1932. o DellaVigna, S., A. Lindner, B. Reizer, and J. F. Schmieder (2017), “Reference-Dependent Job Search: Evidence from Hungary,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(4), 1969-2018. o Ericson, K. M. M. and A. Fuster (2011), “Expectations as Endowments: Evidence on Reference-Dependent Preferences from Exchange and Valuation Experiments,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(4), 1879-1907. o Farber, H. S. 2005. “Is Tomorrow Another Day? The Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers.” Journal of Political Economy, 113(1), 46-82. o Farber, H. S. 2008. “Reference-Dependent Preferences and Labor Supply: The Case of New York City Taxi Drivers.” American Economic Review, 98(3), 1069-1082. o Genesove, D. and C. Mayer (2001), “Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001, 116(4), 1233-1260. o Gneezy, U., L. Goette, C. Sprenger, and F. Zimmermann (2017), “The Limits of Expectations-Based Reference Dependence,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 15(4), 861-876. o Kahneman, D., J. L. Knetsch, and R. H. Thaler (1990), “Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem,” Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), 1325-1348. o Koszegi, B. and M. Rabin (2006), “A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(4), 1133-1165. o List, J. A. (2003), “Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 41-71. o Pope, D. G. and M. E. Schweitzer (2011), “Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse? Persistent Bias in the Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes,” American Economic Review, 101(1), 129-157. o Rees-Jones, A. (2017), “Quanifying Loss-Averse Tax Manipulation,” Review of Economic Studies, 85(2), 1251-1278. o Sprenger, C. (2015), “An Endowment Effect for Risk: Experimental Tests of Stochastic Reference Points,” Journal of Political Economy, 123(6), 1456-1499. Background reading o O’Donoghue, T. and C. Sprenger. “Reference-Dependent Preferences.” Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications and Foundations 1, 2018: 1-77. o Barberis, Nicholas C. (2013), “Thirty Years of Prospect Theory in Economics: A Review and Assessment,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(1), 173-196. Topic 4: Biased Beliefs and Probabilistic Reasoning  Misperceptions about randomness: Gambler’s fallay, law of small numbers, hot-hand bias  Biased belief updating: Base-rate neglect, Representative heuristics, prior-based inference, confirmation bias, preference-based inference, motivated reasoning  Optimistic beliefs; Optimal expectations  Cognitive dissonance Key reading list o Akerlof, G. A. and W. T. Dickens (1982), “The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance,” American Economic Review, 72(3), 307-319. o Benabou, R. (2013), “Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets,” Review of Economic Studies, 80, 429-462. o Benabou, R. and J. Tirole (2011), “Identity, Morals, and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(2), 805-855. o Brunnermeier, M. K. and J. A. Parker (2005), “Optimal Expectations,” American Economic Review, 95(4), 1092-1118. o Brunnermeier, M. K., F. Papakonstantinou, and J. A. Parker (2017), “Optimal Time-Inconsistent Beliefs: Misplanning, Procrastination, and Commitment,” Management Science, 2017. o Costa Gomes, M. and V. Crawford. (2006), “Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review, 96(5), 1737-1768. o Costa Gomes, M., V. Crawford, and B. Broseta. (2001), “Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study,” Econometrica, 69(5), 1193-1235. o Chen, D., T. Moskowitz, and K. Shue (2016), “Decision Making under the Gambler’s Fallacy: Evidence from Asylum Judges, Loan Officiers, and Baseball Umpires,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(3), 1181-1242. o Eil, D. and J. Rao (2011), “The Good News-Bad News Effect: Asymmetric Processing of Objective Information about Yourself,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3(2), 114-138. o Epstein, L. (2006), “An Axiomatic Model of Non-Bayesian Updating,” Review of Economic Studies, 73, 413-436. o Grether, D.M. (1980), “Bayes Rule as a Descriptive Model: the Representativeness Heuristic,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 95(3), 537-557. o Oster, E., I. Shoulson, and E.R. Dorsey (2013), “Optimal Expectations and Limited Medical Testing: Evidence from Huntington Disease,” American Economic Review, 103(2), 262-285. o Rabin, M. and D. Vayanos (2010), “The Gambler’s and Hot-Hand Fallacies: Theory and Applications,” Review of Economic Studies, 77(2), 730-778. Background reading list o Benjamin, D. J. “Errors in Probabilistic Reasoning and Judgement Biases.” Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications and Foundations 2, 2019: 69-186. o Camerer, C. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory. Princeton University Press. o Eyster, E. “Errors in Strategic Reasoning.” Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications and Foundations 2, 2019: 187-259. o Goldman, R., D. Hagmann, and G. Loewenstein (2017), “Information Avoidance,” Journal of Economic Literature, 55(1), 96-135. Topics 5. Intertemporal Choice  Reference dependence  Intertemporal choice Key reading list o Acland, D. and M.R. Levy (2015), “Naivete, Projection Bias, and Habit Formation in Gym Attendance,” Management Science, 61(1), 146-160. o Alan, S. and S. Ertac (2018), “Fostering Patience in the Classroom: Results from a Randomized Educational Intervention,” Journal of Political Economy, 126(5), 1865-1911. o Andreoni, J. and C. Sprenger (2012), “Estimating Time Preferences from Convex Budgets,” American Economic Review, 102(7), 3333-3356. o Ariely, D. and K. Wertenbroch (2002), “Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self-Control by Precommitment,” Psychological Science, 13(3), 219-224. o Ashraf, N., D. Karlan, and W. Yin (2006), “Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence from a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121, 2, 635-672. o Augenblick, N., M. Niederle, and C. Sprenger (2018), “Working over Time: Dynamic Inconsistency in Real Effort Task,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 30(3), 1067-1115. o DellaVigna, S. and U. Malmendier (2004), “Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 353-402. o DellaVigna, S. and U. Malmendier (2006), “Paying Not to Go to the Gym,” American Economic Review, 96, 3, 694-719. o Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine (2006), “A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control,” American Economic Review, 96(5), 1449-1476. o Kuchler, T. and M. Pagel (2021), “Sticking to Your Plan: The Role of Present Bias for Credit Card Paydown,” Journal of Financial Economics, 139(2), 359-388. o Laibson, D. (1997), “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 62(2), 443-478. o Laibson, D. (2015), “Why Don’t Present-Biased Agents Make Commitments?” American Economic Review, 105(5), 267-272. o O’Donoghue, T. and M. Rabin (1999a), “Doing It Now or Later,” American Economic Review, 89(1), 103-124. o O’Donoghue, T. and M. Rabin (1999b), “Incentives for Procrastination,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 769-816. o O’Donoghue, T. and M. Rabin (2006), “Optimal Sin Taxes,” Journal of Public Economics, 90, 1825-1849. o Sadoff, S., A. Samek, and C. Sprenger (2020), “Dynamic Inconsistency in Food Choice: Experimental Evidence from Two Food Deserts,” Review of Economic Studies, 87(4), 1954-1988. o Strotz, R. H. (1956), “Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization,” Review of Economic Studies, 23, 165-180. o Background reading o Ericson, K. K., and D. Laibson. “Intertemporal Choice.” Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications and Foundations 2, 2019: 1-67. o Frederick, S., G. Lowenstein, and T. O’Donoghue (2002), “Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review,” Journal of Economic Literature, 40(2), 351-401. o Topics 6. Social Preferences and Incentives  Evidence and models of social preferences and reciprocity  Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation: social signaling, crowding out Key reading list o Benabou, R. and J. Tirole (2003), “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation,” Review of Economic Studies, 70(3), 489-520. o Breza, E., S. Kaur, and Y. Shamdasani (2018), “The Morale Effects of Pay Inequality,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 133(2), 611-663. o Cappelen, A., J. List, A. Samek, and B. Tungodden (2020), “The Effect of Early-Childhood Education on Social Preferences,” Journal of Political Economy, 128(7), 2739-2758. o Card, D. A. Mas, E. Moretti, and E. Saez (2012), “Inequality at Work: The Effect of Peer Salaries on Job Satisfaction,” American Economic Review, 102(6), 2981-3003. o Charness, G. and M. Rabin. 2002. “Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3), 817-869. o DellaVigna, S., J. A. List, and U. Malmendier (2012), “Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(1), 1-56. o DellaVigna, S., J. A. List, U. Malmendier, and G. Rao (2021), “Estimating Social Preferences and Gift Exchange at Work,” mimeo. o Dufwenberg, M. and G. Kirchsteiger (2014), “A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity,” Games and Economic Behavior, 47(2), 268-298. o Falk, Armin (2007), “Gift Exchange in the Field,” Econometrica, 75(5), 1501-1511. o Falk, Armin, and Michael Kosfeld (2006), “The Hidden Cost of Control,” American Economic Review, 96(5), 1611-1630. o Fehr, E., G. Kirchsteiger, and A. Riedl (1993), “Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(2), 437-459. o Fehr, E. and K. M. Schmidt. 1999. “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114. 817-868. o Gneezy, U. and J. A. List (2006), “Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments,” Econometrica, 74(5), 1365-1384. o Gneezy, U. and A. Rustichini (2000), “Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3), 791-810. o Gneezy, U. and A. Rustichini (2000), “A Fine is a Price,” Journal of Legal Studies, 29(1), 1-17. o Kube, S., M. A. Marechal, and C. Puppe (2013), “Do Wage Cuts Damage Work Morale? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(4), 853-870. o Lazear, E. P., U. Malmendier, and R. A. Weber (2012), “Sorting in Experiments with Application to Social Preferences,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4(1), 136-163. o Rabin, M. (1993), “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,” American Economic Review, 83(5), 1281-1302. o Rao, G. (2019), “Familiarity Does Not Breed Contempt: Generosity, Discrimination, and Diversity in Delhi Schools,” American Economic Review, 109(3), 2019. o Shin, E., S. Choi, B. Kim, E. Lee, and Y. Park (2022), “A Student-Centered Learning Increases the Value of (Indirect) Friendship,” mimeo. Background reading o Bowles, S., and S. Polania-Reyes. (2012) “Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?” Journal of Economic Literature, 50(2): 368-425. Topics 7. Strategic Reasoning  Behavioral game theory; Level-k  Underinference: winner’s curse; Cursed equilibrium  Measuring higher-order rationality; strategic thinking skills Key reading list o Brown, A.L., C. F. Camerer, and D. Lovallo (2012), “To Review or Not to Review? Limited Strategic Thinking at the Movie Box Office,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 4(2), 1-26. o Choi, S., S. Kim, and W. Lim (2022), “Strategic Thinking Skills and Their Economic Importance,” mimeo. o Costa Gomes, M. and V. Crawford. (2006), “Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review, 96(5), 1737-1768. o Costa Gomes, M., V. Crawford, and B. Broseta. (2001), “Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study,” Econometrica, 69(5), 1193-1235. o Esponda, I. (2008), “Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection,” American Economic Review, 98(4), 1269-1291. o Esponda, I. and E. Vespa (2018), “Endogenous Sample Selection: A Laboratory Study,” Quantitative Economics, 9, 183-216. o Eyster, E. and M. Rabin (2005), “Cursed Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 73(5), 1623-1672. o Holt, C. and R. Sherman (1994), “The Loser’s Curse,” American Economic Review, 84, 642-652. o Ivanov, A., D. Levin, and M. Niederle (2010), “Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner’s Curse? An Experimental Study,” Econometrica, 78(4), 1435-1452. o Kagel, J. and D. Levin (1986), “The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions,” American Economic Review, 76(5), 894-920. o Kneeland, T. (2015), “Identifying Higher-Order Rationality,” Econometrica, 83(5), 265-279. o Nagel, R. (1995), “Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review, 85(5), 1313-1326. Background reading list o Camerer, C. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory. Princeton University Press. o Eyster, E. “Errors in Strategic Reasoning.” Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications and Foundations 2, 2019: 187-259. o Kagel, J. and D. Levin. 2002. Common Value Auctions and the Winner’s Curse. Princeton University Press. Topic 8. Nudges Key reading list o Allcott, H. (2011), “Social Norms and Energy Conservation,” Journal of Public Economics, 95, 1082-1095. o Allcott, H. and T. Rogers (2014), “The Short-Run and Long-Run Effects of Behavioral Interventions: Experimental Evidence from Energy Conservation,” American Economic Review, 104(10), 3003-3037. o Madrian, B. and D. F. Shea (2001), “The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4), 1149-1187. o Thaler, R. H. and S. Benartzi (2004), “Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving,” Journal of Political Economy, 112(1): 164-87. o Thaler, Richard H. and Cass R. Sustein. 2003. “Libertarian Paternalism,” American Economic Review, 93(2), 175-179. o DellaVigna, S. and E. Linos (2022). “RCTs to Scale: Comprehensive Evidence from Two Nudge Units,” Econometrica, 90, 81-116. o Mertens, S., M. Herberz, U. J. J. Hahnel, and T. Brosch (2022), “The Effectiveness of Nudging: A Meta-Analysis of Choice Architecture Interventions across Behavioral Domains,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 119(1), e2107346118. o

수강생 참고사항

  • 참고사항: • 수강생은 학기말까지 (제출일은 추후공지) 행태경제학 기반 연구 텀페이퍼를 제출해야 함. 텀페이퍼는 통상적인 경제학 논문의 구조를 따라야 함. 텀페이퍼 작성을 위해 학기중에 담당교수와 개별 면담할 것을 권장함. • 수업은 담당교수의 강의로 주로 진행되며, 주기적으로 (예를 들어, 2주마다) 리딩리스트에 있는 논문에 대해 학생 발표도 진행할 예정임.
  • 면담시간/장소: 이메일로 면담 요청시 오피스 아워 가질 예정임.

개설 이력

학년도학기정원/수강언어주담당교수강의계획서
20251학기20/12한국어최승주↗
20241학기20/22한국어최승주↗
20231학기20/15한국어최승주↗
20221학기20/25한국어최승주↗

See also

인접 그래프

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